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1.  Introduction 
A 1997 article titled ‘The Complementary Role of Environmental and Security Biological 
Control Regimes in the 21st Century’ that appeared in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA) argued that: 
As we approach the 21st century, there is increased worldwide concern about disease, 
whether natural or deliberate, in humans, animals, and plants. There are 2 driving 
forces for multilateral biological control regimes: international/national security and 
environmental protection. With respect to deliberately caused disease, these 
seemingly disparate forces are mutually reinforcing as demonstrated by simultaneous 
moves to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the entry into 
force of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Future multilateral biological 
control regimes based on these developments will aid the security, prosperity, and 
health of the world community.1  
More than two decades later, it is evident that there remains a need to foster a web of policies, 
approaches, and measures that strengthen biological security: the successful minimising of 
the risks that the biological sciences may be accidentally or deliberately misused in a way 
which causes harm for humans, animals, plants or the environment.2 The web of prevention, 
we argue, continues to be of vital importance in enhancing the health, prosperity, and security 
of the world community.  
This article reviews the conclusions of the 1997 JAMA paper in the light of the dynamic 
international security context, on the one hand, and the rapidly evolving life science 
landscape, on the other, in order to develop a conceptual framework for promoting the 
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implementation of biosafety and biosecurity policies, standards, regulations, and guidelines. 
The terms ‘biosafety’ and ‘biosecurity’ are used to denote the purpose of the different 
international instruments: biosafety instruments are those that seek to prevent the 
unintentional (accidental) release of pathogens and toxins, including naturally occurring 
disease, whereas biosecurity instruments are those that seek to prevent the deliberate release 
and misuse of pathogens and toxins. Section 2 of the paper examines the evolution of the 
spectrum of biological risks over the past two decades to account for the growing recognition 
of the complementarity of biosafety and biosecurity for effective biological risk management. 
The concept of a ‘web of prevention’ is introduced in Section 3 to develop a systematic 
classification of biosafety and biosecurity instruments by purpose. The article concludes in 
Section 4 by recommending steps to be taken for strengthening the web of prevention and 
upholding and strengthening the norms against accidental and deliberate disease.  
2. The Spectrum of Biological Risks in the Twentieth-First Century 
Disease outbreaks are classified as naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate. 
Traditionally, each type of disease has been addressed by a different set of measures: public 
health measures are used to prevent naturally occurring disease; biosafety measures are used 
to prevent disease as a result of industrial and laboratory accidents and/or negligence; and 
biosecurity, including disarmament measures are used to prevent deliberate disease. Yet 
disease recognises no borders and the globalised systems of international travel, trade, and 
communication can turn a local event into a global crisis, as the 2004 SARS and 2014-2015 
Ebola outbreaks have demonstrated. Antimicrobial resistance coupled with the impact of 
climate change on disease patterns and the re-emergence of vaccine-preventable diseases are 
symptomatic of the challenges that global public health faces.3 The progress of biotechnology 
over the past few decades promises to make a significant contribution to addressing some of 
these issues, for example, through the generation of novel drugs and therapeutics. At the 
same time, there are concerns that the global diffusion of cutting-edge life science 
capabilities, such as genome-editing and synthetic biology, both in and outside traditional 
research environments (e.g. emergence of community laboratories and ‘do-it-yourself’ 
biology movement) increases the risk of accidental and deliberate misuse of life science 
knowledge and materials against humans, animals, or plants. Against this backdrop, the need 
for reconciling the benefits that are likely to be accrued from the continuous advancement of 
the life sciences with the potential risks arising from the availability, accessibility, and 
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affordability of the knowledge, tools, and technologies necessary for conducting scientific 
work requires special attention.4   
According to the report Human Security Now published by the Commission on Human 
Security in 2003, ‘good health is both essential and instrumental to achieving human 
security’.5 Around the same time, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) coined 
the concept of ‘One Health’ which holds that ‘human health and animal health are 
interdependent and bound to the health of the [natural] ecosystems in which they exist’.6 
More recently, this understanding of the human-animal-ecosystems interface has been 
incorporated in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that features 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including: 
 Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; 
 Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources; 
 Goal 15: Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land 
degradation, and halt biodiversity loss.7 
Life science research and development (R&D) has an important role to play in achieving the 
SDGs by providing ‘breakthrough products and technologies to combat debilitating and rare 
diseases, stop the outbreak of infectious diseases, reduce our environmental footprint, relieve 
poverty, feed the hungry, use less and cleaner energy, provide clean drinking water, protect 
biological diversity on land and in our oceans, and have safer, cleaner and more efficient 
industrial manufacturing processes’.8 Hence, harnessing the potential of biotechnology for 
promoting economic growth through sustainable and socially responsible production and 
innovation has attracted considerable state and business investment.  
Yet as life science knowledge and capabilities diffuse and multiply, so does the potential for 
an accidental or deliberate release of biological agents. Writing at the turn of the 21st century, 
Mathew Meselson noted that: 
 Every major technology – metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, 
electronics, nuclear energy – has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful 
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purposes but also for hostile ones. Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain 
to be a dominant technology of the twenty-first century?9  
In 2019, the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) 
published a report that echoed some of Meselson’s concerns: 
Synthetic biology expands what is possible in creating new weapons. It also expands 
the range of actors who could undertake such efforts and decreases the time 
required.10  
The report further observed that, 
[…] synthetic biology approaches also have the potential to be used in ways that 
could change the presentation of an attack, for example, by modifying the properties 
of existing microorganisms, using microorganisms to produce chemicals, or 
employing novel or unexpected strategies to cause harm. It is valuable for the U.S. 
government to pay close attention to rapidly advancing fields such as synthetic 
biology, just as it did to advances in chemistry and physics during the Cold War era. 
However, approaches modelled after those taken to counter Cold War threats are not 
sufficient to address biological and biologically enabled chemical weapons in the age 
of synthetic biology.11  
The advent of enabling life science advances coupled with the emergence of illicit online 
markets (e.g. Darknet) and an open-access pool of scientific knowledge constitute a critical 
governance (and security) challenge that can hardly be addressed through a traditional 
disarmament approach alone. This trend has been recognised and acknowledged by the States 
Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the principal international 
agreement that prohibits the development, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention of biological 
weapons. The Fifth Review Conference of the BTWC held in 2002 agreed an Inter-Sessional 
Programme of Work to discuss and promote common understanding and effective action on 
the following topics: 
i. the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in 
the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; 
ii. national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of 
pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; 
iii. enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating 
the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious 
outbreaks of disease; 
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iv. strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and 
existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of 
infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants; 
v. the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists.12 
 
At the same time, the need for an integrated approach to countering natural, accidental, and 
deliberate disease has been underscored in the 2004 edition of the World Health Organisation 
guidance document titled Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Weapons 
which recommended that ‘considerations for [countering] deliberate releases of biological or 
chemical agents should be incorporated into existing public health infrastructures, rather than 
developing separate infrastructures’.13  
3. A Web of Prevention for Biosafety and Biosecurity 
 
This section outlines a conceptual framework for the implementation of biosafety and 
biosecurity international regulations, policies, and guidelines for promoting a comprehensive 
and integrated approach to the management of biological risks in the twenty-first century. 
The framework is centred on the concept of a ‘web of prevention’ which originated in the 
early 1990s as the ‘web of deterrence’.14 The web of prevention refers to the different strands 
/ lines of action that are required for effective biological risk management, regardless of 
whether biological risks occur naturally, or are accidentally or deliberately caused. The model 
proposed here groups the different strands of the web in two overarching categories: 
international biosafety instruments and international biosecurity instruments. The instruments 
are grouped based on their primary purpose, that is whether they aim to prevent the 
unintentional (accidental) release of biological agents and toxins, including naturally 
occurring diseases (biosafety), or whether they aim to prevent the deliberate release of 
biological agents and toxins (biosecurity). The model of a web of prevention is presented in 
Figure 1.  
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Simon Whitby, eds. Preventing biological threats: what you can do (Bradford: University of Bradford, 2015), 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/0A20E57D9F8424B8C12581D8007EC32E?OpenDocum
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Figure 1: The Web of Prevention for Biosafety and Biosecurity 
 
 
3.1 International Biosafety Instruments  
Depending on their thematic focus, international biosafety instruments cover three areas: 
health and food security; biodiversity preservation; and safe handling, including shipment, 
transport, and transfer of biological agents and toxins.  
Health and Food Security 
The provision of accessible good-quality healthcare is an essential condition for the socio-
economic and political stability of States. Maintaining a functioning and resilient healthcare 
system also enhances States’ capacity for response to disease outbreaks and helps mitigate 
negative impacts, including the loss of lives. The International Health Regulations (IHRs) 
that were adopted in 2005 by the World Health Organization (WHO) and are binding on all 
States seek to ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the 
international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public 
health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.15 
Under the IHRs, States are obliged to ‘develop, strengthen and maintain […] the capacity to 
detect, assess, notify, and report’ biological events, as well as to ‘develop, strengthen, and 
maintain […] the capacity to respond promptly and effectively to public health risks and 
public health emergencies of international concern’. 
As observed in Section 2, public health is dependent on the health of natural ecosystems. It 
also requires safe and reliable food supply which in turn highlights the importance of 
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sustainable agriculture based on ecologically-friendly farming and stock-breeding practices. 
The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code sets out 
the standards for the improvement of animal health and welfare and veterinary public health 
worldwide, including the safe international trade in terrestrial animals and their products.16 
Likewise, the OIE Aquatic Animal Health Code sets out the standards for the improvement of 
aquatic animal health and welfare of farmed fish worldwide, and for safe international trade 
in aquatic animals.17 Both Codes provide information on the OIE-listed notifiable terrestrial 
and aquatic animal diseases that are being monitored in real-time through the World Animal 
Health Information System (WAHIS).18 WAHIS also serves as an early-warning system for 
epidemiological events that occur on the territory of OIE Member States. Besides WAHIS, 
the OIE administers the Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway, a capacity 
building platform that provides national veterinary services with a comprehensive 
understanding of their strengths and weaknesses using a globally consistent methodology 
based on international standards.19  
The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) adopted in 1951 and administered by 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) aims to secure 
coordinated, effective action to prevent and control the introduction and spread of pests of 
plants and plant products.20 The Convention is recognised by the World Trade Organization's 
(WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS 
Agreement) as the only international standard setting body for plant health. While the IPPC's 
primary focus is on plants and plant products moving in international trade, the Convention 
also covers research materials, biological control organisms, germplasm banks, containment 
facilities, food aid, emergency aid and anything else that can act as a vector for the spread of 
plant pests – for example, containers, packaging materials, soil, vehicles, vessels and 
machinery.21 
 
FAO also administers the internationally adopted food standards set in Codex Alimentarius.22 
In 2010, FAO established an Emergency Prevention System for Food Safety (EMPRES Food 
Safety) to serve as a key international system to assist in the prevention and management of 
                                                          
16 World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Paris: World Animal Health 
Organisation, 2019), https://www.oie.int/en/standard-setting/terrestrial-code/access-online/ (accessed 24 
October 2019).  
17 World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Aquatic Animal Health Code (Paris: World Animal Health 
Organisation, 2019), https://www.oie.int/en/standard-setting/aquatic-code/access-online/ (accessed 24 October 
2019).  
18 World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), World Animal Health Information System, 2019, 
https://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/the-world-animal-health-information-system/the-world-animal-
health-information-system/ (accessed 24 October 2019).  
19 World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Performance of Veterinary Services (PVS) Pathway, 2019, 
https://www.oie.int/solidarity/pvs-pathway/ (accessed 24 October 2019).  
20 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Plant Protection Convention (1951), 
2019, https://www.ippc.int/en/structure/ (accessed 24 October 2019).  
21 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Plant Protection Convention (1951), 
2019, https://www.ippc.int/en/structure/ (accessed 24 October 2019).  
22 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Codex Alimentarius (1963), 2019, 
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global food safety emergencies.23 The EMPRES system allows authorities to better appreciate 
and understand major food safety risks and to refocus prevention efforts. It also allows early 
detection of adverse food safety events and prompt and effective response. FAO collaborates 
with WHO and OIE in a number of activities aimed at prevention and management of food 
safety emergencies. 
 
To advance the development of an integrated approach to health security, the Global Health 
Security Agenda (GHSA), a global collaborative, multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder 
initiative was launched in 2014. GHSA is a political driver that leverages and complements 
the strengths and resources of global partners to build and improve country capacity and 
leadership in the prevention and early detection of, and effective response to, infectious 
disease threats.24 GHSA is structured around 11 Action Packages in the areas of prevention, 
detection, and response to biological risks. It is worth noting that two of the GHSA Action 
Packages that are currently being implemented (Prevent 3, Biosafety and Biosecurity and 
Respond 2, Linking Public Health with Law and Multisectoral Rapid Response) address 
biosecurity issues, as well.25  
 
Biodiversity Preservation  
 
Biodiversity plays a critical role in ensuring the health of natural ecosystems. Its preservation 
is therefore indispensable to the implementation of a ‘one health’ approach for realising 
health security. The Convention on Biological Diversity which entered into force in 1993 
seeks to ensure (1) the conservation of biological diversity; (2) the sustainable use of the 
components of biological diversity; and (3) the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources.26 To this end, the Convention contains 
provisions for the identification and monitoring of biological species that may require urgent 
conservation (Art. 7), promotion of awareness of the measures required for the conservation 
of biological diversity, including through formal education (Art. 13), and development of 
appropriate procedures and arrangements for environmental impact assessment for any 
projects that are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity (Art. 14). 
The Convention further acknowledges the adverse effects that living modified organisms 
(LMOs) may have on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, as well as 
the need for an additional protocol setting out appropriate procedures for the safe handling, 
transport, and use of LMOs (Art. 19).  
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity which 
entered into force in 2003 aims to ensure the safe handling, transport, and use of living 
                                                          
23 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Emergency Prevention System for Food Safety 
(EMPRES Food Safety), 2019, http://www.fao.org/food/food-safety-quality/empres-food-safety/en/ (accessed 24 
October 2019).  
24 Global Health Security Agenda, 2019, https://www.ghsagenda.org/ (accessed 24 October 2019).  
25 Global Health Security Agenda, Action Packages, 2019, https://www.ghsagenda.org/packages (accessed 24 
October 2019). 
26 Convention on Biological Diversity (1993), 2019, https://www.cbd.int/intro/default.shtml (accessed 24 
October 2019).  
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modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse 
effects on biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health (Cartagena 
Protocol 2003).27 The Protocol establishes an advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure 
for ensuring that countries are provided with the information necessary to make informed 
decisions before agreeing to the import of such organisms into their territory (Art. 7). It also 
contains provisions for risk assessment (Art. 15) and risk management (Art. 16), as well as 
for emergency measures in case of an unintentional transboundary movement of a living 
modified organism (Art. 17). In order to assist States with the implementation of the 
Cartagena Protocol, a technical document titled Guidance on Risk Assessment of Living 
Modified Organisms and Monitoring in the Context of Risk Assessment was published in 
201628 and a Training Manual on the Detection and Identification of Living Modified 
Organisms in the Context of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is currently being 
developed.29 The Protocol also establishes a Biosafety Clearing-House to facilitate the 
exchange of information on living modified organisms and to assist countries in the 
implementation of the Protocol. The Biosafety Clearing-House gives global access to a 
variety of relevant scientific, technical, environmental, legal and capacity building 
information.30  
 
To strengthen the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety with regard to LMOs, a 
supplementary protocol, the Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability 
and Redress which introduces international rules and procedures in the field of liability and 
redress relating to living modified organisms has been adopted.31 The Supplementary 
Protocol entered into force in 2018.  
 
Article 25 of the Convention on Biological Diversity establishes an open-ended 
intergovernmental scientific advisory body known as the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, 
Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) to provide the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) with timely advice relating to the implementation of the Convention.32 In 2014, the 
Conference of the Parties, noting the conclusions of the SBSTTA with regard to the issue of 
synthetic biology, decided to establish an Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Synthetic 
                                                          
27 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2003), 2019, 
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol (accessed 24 October 2019).  
28 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Guidance on risk assessment of living modified organisms and monitoring 
in the context of risk assessment, UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/8/8/Add.1, 14 September 2016, 
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/cpb_technicalseries.shtml#bst4 (accessed 24 October 2019).  
29 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Draft training manual on detection and identification of living modified 
organisms, CBD/CP/MOP/9/8/Add.1, 13 September 2018,  
https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/53d0/e838/574441c6ca03e5e68340abdd/cp-mop-09-08-add1-en.pdf (accessed 24 
October 2019).  
30 Convention on Biological Diversity, Biosafety clearing-house, 2019, https://bch.cbd.int/ (accessed 24 October 
2019). 
31 Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety (2018), 2019, http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/supplementary/ (accessed 24 October 2019). 
32 Convention on Biological Diversity, Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice 
(SBSTTA), 2019, https://www.cbd.int/sbstta/ (accessed 24 October 2019).  
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Biology.33 The mandate of this Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group includes among other things 
the following objectives: 
 
 Identify if other national, regional and/or international instruments adequately 
regulate the organisms, components or products derived from synthetic biology 
techniques in so far as they impact on the objectives of the Convention and its 
Protocols; 
 Identify the potential benefits and risks of organisms, components and products 
arising from synthetic biology techniques to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity and related human health and socioeconomic impacts relevant to the 
mandate of the Convention and its Protocols; Building on the work on risk assessment 
and risk management undertaken by the Cartagena Protocol, compile information on 
best practices on risk assessment and monitoring regimes currently used by Parties to 
the Convention and other Governments, including transboundary movement, to 
inform those who do not have national risk assessment or monitoring regimes, or are 
in the process of reviewing their current risk assessment or monitoring regimes and to 
help those Parties and other Governments to regulate organisms, components and 
products from synthetic biology techniques appropriately; 
 Identify if the existing arrangements constitute a comprehensive framework in order 
to address impacts of organisms, components and products resulting from synthetic 
biology relevant to the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity and its 
Protocols, in particular threats of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity. 
 
Among the substantive issues that were considered by the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group 
on Synthetic Biology during its meeting in June 2019 were: 
 
 New technological developments in synthetic biology; 
 Synthetic biology applications that are in early stages of research and development, 
vis-à-vis the three objectives of the Convention; 
 Synthetic biology organisms that may fall outside the definition of living modified 
organisms as per the Cartagena Protocol; 
 The state of knowledge on the potential environmental impacts of applications of 
synthetic biology, including those applications that involve organisms containing 
engineered gene drives; 
 Options for regular horizon scanning, monitoring and assessing of developments.34 
 
                                                          
33 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision XII/24: New and emerging 
issues: synthetic biology, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/XII/24, 17 October 2014,  
https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-12/cop-12-dec-24-en.pdf (accessed 24 October 2019).  
34 Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of the Ad-Hoc Expert Group on Synthetic Biology, 
CBD/SYNBIO/AHTEG/2019/1/3, 7 June 2019,  
https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/b2bb/cf58/b09729bb00be6abf72325a1a/synbio-ahteg-2019-01-03-en.pdf (accessed 
24 October 2019).  
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During its Twenty-Second Meeting held in July 2018, the SBSTTA recommended the 
establishment of an Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Risk Assessment for the 
identification and prioritization of specific issues regarding risk assessment of living 
modified organisms.35 This recommendation was adopted by the Conference of the Parties to 
the CBD serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol (COP-MOP) on 
Biosafety in November 2018.36 The Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Risk Assessment is 
expected also to complement the work of the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Synthetic 
Biology.  
 
In addition to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in 2010 the Parties to the CBD adopted 
the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD 
2019d).37 The Nagoya Protocol which entered into force in 2014 provides a transparent legal 
framework for the effective implementation of one of the three objectives of the CBD: the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.  
 
Safe Handling of Biological Materials 
 
Safe and responsible procedures and practices for handling, shipping, transfer, and transport 
of biological agents and toxins are required for preventing laboratory acquired infections and 
ensuring that such materials are not accidentally released in the environment. The 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) is currently developing an ISO 
Management System Standard titled ISO 35001 on Biorisk Management for Laboratories and 
other Related Organisations.38 ISO 35001 is intended as a performance-based standard which 
can be used for improving the overall biorisk performance of laboratories and research 
facilities.39 It is expected to be published in late 2019.  
 
The 2004 Laboratory Biosafety Manual (3rd Edition) of the World Health Organisation builds 
upon the two earlier versions of the document (1983 and 1993) in seeking to ‘encourage 
countries to accept and implement basic concepts in biological safety and to develop national 
                                                          
35 Convention on Biological Diversity, Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Technological Advice, 
Recommendation 22/2: Risk assessment and risk management of living modified organisms, 
CBD/SBSTTA/REC/22/2, 7 July 2018, https://www.cbd.int/doc/recommendations/sbstta-22/sbstta-22-rec-02-
en.pdf (accessed 24 October 2019).  
36 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Decision 9/13: Risk assessment and risk management (Articles 15 and 16), 
CBD/CP/MOP/DEC/9/13, 30 November 2018, https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cp-mop-09/cp-mop-09-dec-
13-en.pdf (accessed 24 October 2019).  
37 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2014), 2019  
https://www.cbd.int/abs/about/default.shtml (accessed 24 October 2019).  
38 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 35001 – Biorisk management for laboratories and other 
related organizations, 2019, https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:35001:ed-1:v1:en (accessed 25 October 
2019).  
39 Patty Olinger, ‘ISO 35001: Biorisk management for laboratories and other related organizations’, paper 
presented at USDA ARS 5th International Biosafety and Biocontainment Symposium, Baltimore, MD, 12 
February 2019,  https://arssymposium.absa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1025-SIMS-Olinger.pdf (accessed 
25 October 2019).  
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codes of practice for the safe handling of pathogenic microorganisms in laboratories within 
their geographical borders’.40 It covers risk assessment and safe use of recombinant DNA 
technology, as well as guidelines for the commissioning and certification of laboratories. The 
Manual emphasises the key role of ‘continuous, on-the-job training’ and outlines a set of 
critical elements for an effective biosafety training programme. It also introduces biosecurity 
concepts – the protection of microbiological assets from theft, loss or diversion, which could 
lead to the inappropriate use of these agents to cause public health harm – which are reviewed 
in detail in subsection 3.2. In order to assist in assessments of microbiological laboratory 
safety and security status of biomedical laboratories, the Manual features a safety checklist.  
 
Similarly to the World Health Organisation, the OIE has produced relevant guiding 
documents intended for veterinary laboratories. The Manual of Diagnostic Tests and 
Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals (Terrestrial Manual) aims to provide internationally agreed 
diagnostic laboratory methods and requirements for the production and control of relevant 
vaccines and other biological products and thus contribute to preventing and controlling 
animal diseases, including zoonoses.41 The Manual provides guidance concerning, inter alia 
the management of veterinary diagnostic laboratories; collection, submission, and storage of 
diagnostic specimens; transport of specimens of animal origin; biosafety and biosecurity: 
standard for managing biological risk in the veterinary laboratory and animal facilities. 
 
The Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals aims to ‘provide a standardised 
approach to the diagnosis of the diseases listed in the Aquatic Code, to facilitate health 
certification for trade in aquatic animals and aquatic animal products’.42 The Manual is a key 
and unique document describing the methods that should be applied to the OIE-listed 
diseases in aquatic animal health laboratories all over the world, thus increasing efficiency 
and promoting improvements in aquatic animal health world-wide.  
 
The transport, shipment, and transfer of biological agents and toxins are subject to 
international control. The World Health Organisation technical Guidance on Regulations for 
the Transport of Infectious Substances 2019-2020 provides information for identifying, 
classifying, marking, labelling, packaging, documenting and refrigerating infectious 
substances for transportation and ensuring their safe delivery.43 The Guidance also provides a 
                                                          
40 World Health Organization, Laboratory biosafety manual, 3rd edition (Geneva: World health Organization, 
2004), https://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO_2004_11/en/ 
(accessed 25 October 2019).   
41 World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Manual of diagnostic tests and vaccines for terrestrial animals, 
8th edition (Paris: World Animal Health Organisation, 2018), https://www.oie.int/en/standard-setting/terrestrial-
manual/ (accessed 25 October 2019).  
42 World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Manual of diagnostic tests for aquatic animals (Paris: World 
Organisation for Animal Health, 2019), https://www.oie.int/en/standard-setting/aquatic-manual/access-online/ 
(accessed 25 October 2019). 
43 World Health Organization, Guidance on regulations for the transport of infectious substances 2019-2020 
(Geneva: World Health Organization, 2019),  
https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/guidance_infectious_substances/en/ (accessed 25 October 2019).  
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detailed overview of the United Nations System for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by air, 
water, road, including railway, and post.44 
 
3.2 International Biosecurity Instruments 
 
International biosecurity instruments seek to prevent the deliberate misuse of life science 
knowledge, materials, and technologies in ways that can cause harm to humans, animals, or 
plants. These instruments focus on upholding the international norm against biological 
weapons and promoting the use of the life sciences for peaceful, prophylactic, and protective 
purposes.  
The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and 
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) was concluded in 1925 under the 
auspices of the League of Nations. The Protocol reaffirmed the provisions of the Hague 
Conventions (1899 and 1907) with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land for the 
prohibition of deploying poison weapons and bacteriological methods of warfare during an 
armed conflict.45 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) entered into force in 1975 to 
become the first international legally-binding instrument that outlaws an entire class of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Article I of the Convention defines a general purpose 
criterion for the prohibition of biological weapons: 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, 
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 
(1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 
(2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.46 
The Convention further contains provisions for the prohibition of assisting in the 
development or acquisition of biological weapons (Article III) and for promoting ‘the fullest 
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for 
the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes’ (Article X).  
                                                          
44 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Dangerous goods, 2019, 
http://www.unece.org/?id=3305 (accessed 25 October 2019).  
45 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925), 2019, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/280 
(accessed 25 October 2019).  
46 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1975), 2019,   
https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/77CF2516DDC5DCF5C1257E520032EF67?OpenDocu
ment (accessed 25 October 2019).  
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The BTWC does not possess a formalised system for verification of compliance. The Second 
Review Conference in 1986 agreed to the exchange of Confidence-Building Measures 
(CBMs) “in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions 
and in order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological 
activities”. The CBMs consist of six measures as follows: 
1) CBM A: Part 1: Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories; 
  Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defence research and 
development programmes. 
2) CBM B: Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar 
occurrences caused by toxins. 
3) CBM C: Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge. 
4) CBM E: Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures. 
5) CBM F: Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological 
research and development programmes. 
6) CBM G: Declaration of vaccine production facilities.47 
 
Article IV of the Convention requires that States Parties shall, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the 
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons. The 
Eighth Review Conference held in 2016 when considering Article IV called upon States 
Parties to adopt legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures to ‘ensure the safety 
and security of microbial or other biological agents or toxins in laboratories, facilities, and 
during transportation, to prevent unauthorised access to and removal of such agents or 
toxins.’ The Conference also noted the value of national implementation measures to: 
(a) implement voluntary management standards on biosafety and biosecurity; 
(b) encourage the consideration of development of appropriate arrangements to 
promote awareness among relevant professionals in the private and public sectors 
and throughout relevant scientific and administrative activities;  
(c) promote amongst those working in the biological sciences awareness of the 
obligations of States Parties under the Convention, as well as relevant national 
legislation and guidelines; 
(d) promote the development of training and education programmes for those granted 
access to biological agents and toxins relevant to the Convention and for those with 
the knowledge or capacity to modify such agents and toxins; 
(e) encourage the promotion of a culture of responsibility amongst relevant national  
professionals and the voluntary development, adoption and promulgation of codes of 
conduct; 
(f) strengthen methods and capacities for surveillance and detection of outbreaks of 
disease at the national, regional and international levels, noting that the International 
                                                          
47 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), 2019, 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/5E2E8E6499843CCBC1257E52003ADED4?OpenDocu
ment (accessed 25 October 2019). The CBM forms officially do not feature item D.  
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Health Regulations (2005) are important for building capacity to prevent, protect 
against, control and respond to the international spread of disease; and 
(g) prevent anyone from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring 
or retaining, transporting or transferring and using under any circumstances, 
biological agents and toxins, equipment, or their means of delivery for non-peaceful 
purposes.48 
 
It is therefore evident that BTWC States Parties consider the full and effective 
implementation of the international biosafety instruments an important pre-condition for 
preventing the deliberate misuse of life science knowledge, materials, and technologies. 
Equally, BTWC States Parties recognise the importance of ensuring that those engaged in the 
life sciences are aware of the scope and purpose of the Convention and of their 
responsibilities to contribute to its full and effective implementation.  
 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which entered into force in 1997 prohibits the 
development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention, and use of chemical weapons. CWC is 
similar in structure to the BTWC and both Conventions address and prohibit toxins.49  
Two functional areas of overlap between the BTWC and CWC include the review of 
developments in science and technology and stakeholder engagement through outreach and 
education. The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) that was established in 1997 is a subsidiary 
body within the framework of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) tasked with the provision of specialised advice on science and technology with 
relevance to the Convention.50 In 2011, the SAB set up a Temporary Working Group (TWG) 
on Convergence of Biology and Chemistry. The TWG drew upon a pool of wide-ranging 
expertise featuring industrial and academic scientists, defence laboratory scientists, 
toxicologists, analytical chemists and chemical engineers (including those with experience in 
biomediated processes). The Final Report of the TWG issued in 2014, specifically considered 
the item “On bringing together expertise on the BWC and CWC in order to discuss areas of 
common interest and share relevant knowledge”.51 
 
The Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO) was established as a result of a 
decision of the Twentieth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC in 
                                                          
48 Eighth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Final 
Document. BWC/CONF.VIII/4, 711 January 2017, Geneva, Switzerland.  
https://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/57a6e253edfb1111c1257f39003ca243?OpenDocum
ent&ExpandSection=3#_Section3 (accessed 25 October 2019).  
49 Chemical Weapons Convention (1997), 2019 https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/genesis-
and-historical-development/ (accessed 25 October 2019).  
50 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), 2019, 
https://www.opcw.org/about-us/subsidiary-bodies/scientific-advisory-board (accessed 25 October 2019).  
51 Scientific Advisory Board, Convergence of chemistry and biology: report of the Scientific Advisory Board’s 
Temporary Working Group, SAB/REP/1/14, The Hague: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, 2014,  
https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/TWG_Scientific_Advsiory_Group_Final_Report.pdf 
(accessed 25 October 2019).  
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December 2015.52 Its principal task is to “provide advice on the development of strategies 
and key messages for education and outreach activities that support the implementation of the 
Convention”. The OPCW has also published The Hague Ethical Guidelines which are 
intended to serve as elements for ethical codes and discussion points for ethical issues related 
to the practice of chemistry under the CWC.53 
 
The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 which was adopted 
unanimously under Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace, and Acts of Aggression of the Charter of the United Nations in 2004 addresses the 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and more specifically, the risk that non-
State actors “may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
and their means of delivery”. UNSCR 1540 requires  
[…] that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic 
controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and 
their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related 
materials and to this end shall: 
(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and 
secure such items in production, use, storage or transport; 
(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures; 
(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law 
enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through 
international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering 
in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and 
legislation and consistent with international law; 
(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national 
export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate 
laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export 
and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-
shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to 
proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and 
enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export 
control laws and regulations.54 
 
In order to ensure that international exports do not contribute to the development of 
biological weapons, both the BTWC and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 require States 
to implement domestic controls on the transfer, including the countering of illicit trafficking 
of biological materials and equipment that may assist state or non-state actors in acquiring 
                                                          
52 Chemical Weapons Convention, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Establishment of an Advisory 
Board on Education and Outreach. C-20/DEC.9. 3 December 2015, The Hague, 
https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/C-20/en/c20dec09_e_.pdf (accessed 25 October 2019).  
53 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague Ethical Guidelines (2015), 2019, 
https://www.opcw.org/hague-ethical-guidelines (accessed 25 October 2019).  
54 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004), S/RES/1540 (2004), 28 April 2004,   
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540(2004) (accessed 25 October 2019).  
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biological weapons. The Australia Group is an informal forum of 42 States working on the 
harmonisation of export controls.55 To this end, the Australia Group has developed three 
Common Control Lists with relevance to the prevention of biological and toxin weapons: 
 
 Control List of Dual-use Biological Equipment and Related Technology and Software 
(May 2017); 
 List of Human and Animal Pathogens and Toxins for Export Control (July 2017); 
 List of Plant Pathogens for Export Control (June 2012).  
 
All three biological weapons-related control lists are described in detail in the Australia 
Group Common Control List Handbook, Volume II: Biological Weapons-Related Common 
Control Lists. 56 
Another international initiative that seeks to strengthen customs control is the Green Customs 
Initiative, a partnership of international organisations which cooperate to prevent the illegal 
trade in environmentally-sensitive commodities, and facilitate the legal trade in such 
commodities.57 The aim of the Green Customs Initiative is to enhance the capacity of 
customs and other relevant enforcement personnel to monitor, detect and prevent illegal trade 
in environmentally-sensitive commodities, such as ozone depleting substances (ODS), toxic 
chemical products including toxins, hazardous wastes, endangered species and living-
modified organisms. The Green Customs Initiative operates in partnership with INTERPOL, 
OPCW, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the World Customs 
Organization, among others.  
 
In the event of a suspected deliberate release of bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons, 
any affected state, regardless of whether they are a State Party to the BTWC may request that 
the UN Secretary General Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons (UNSGM) is triggered. The UNSGM grants the UN Secretary General 
the authority to carry out an investigation including a dispatching a fact-finding team to the 
site/s of the alleged incident/s and to report to all UN Member States. The primary purpose of 
the Mechanism is to ascertain in an objective and scientific manner whether a violation of the 
1925 Geneva Protocol has taken place.58 
 
Both the World Health Organisation and the World Organisation for Animal Health have 
developed policy guidance documents that address the need for countering the deliberate 
misuse of the life sciences.  
 
                                                          
55 Australia Group, 2019, https://australiagroup.net/en/ (accessed 25 October 2019).  
56 Australia Group, Volume II: biological weapons-related common control lists, 4 February 2018, 
https://australiagroup.net/en/controllists.html (accessed 25 October 2019).  
57 Green Customs Initiative, 2019, http://www.greencustoms.org/ (accessed 25 October 2019).  
58 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged 
Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 2019, https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/secretary-general-
mechanism/ (accessed 25 October 2019).  
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In 2006, the World Health Organisation published a document titled Biorisk Management: 
Laboratory Biosecurity Guidance, which provides detailed guidance on laboratory 
biosecurity and addresses its basic principles and best practices for preventing the loss, theft, 
and misuse of biological agents and toxins. According to the Guidance document, laboratory 
biosecurity measures should be based on a comprehensive programme of accountability for 
valuable biological materials (VBM) that includes:  
 
1. Regularly updated inventories with storage locations; 
2. Identification and selection of personnel with access; 
3. Plans of use of VBM; 
4. Clearance and approval processes; 
5. Documentation of internal and external transfers within and between facilities; 
and 
6. Inactivation and/or disposal of the material.59 
 
In addition, institutional laboratory biosecurity protocols should include how to handle 
breaches or near-breaches in laboratory biosecurity. The Guidance further outlines an 
integrated biorisk management approach underpinned by three key components: 
 
1. Reducing the risk of unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins or their 
accidental release (biosafety), and reducing the risk of unauthorized access, loss, 
theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of VBM to tolerable, acceptable 
levels (laboratory biosecurity); 
2. Providing assurance, internally and externally (facility, local area, government, 
global community, etc.), that suitable measures have been adopted and effectively 
implemented; 
3. Providing a framework for continuous awareness-raising for biosafety, laboratory 
biosecurity and ethical code of conduct, and training within the facility.60 
 
In 2010, the World Health Organisation published a document titled Responsible Life 
Sciences Research for Global Health Security: A Guidance Document which “aims at 
strengthening the culture of scientific integrity and excellence characterised by openness, 
honesty, accountability and responsibility: such a culture is the best protection against 
accidents and deliberate misuse, and the best guarantee of scientific progress and 
development”.61 The Guidance is intended to help researchers and institutions: 
 
                                                          
59 World Health Organization, Biorisk management: laboratory biosecurity guidance (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2006), https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/WHO_CDS_EPR_2006_6/en/ (accessed 25 October 
2019). 
60 World Health Organization, Biorisk management: laboratory biosecurity guidance (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2006), https://www.who.int/ihr/publications/WHO_CDS_EPR_2006_6/en/ (accessed 25 October 
2019).  
61 World Health Organization, Responsible life sciences research for global health security: a guidance 
document (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2010),  
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/HSE_GAR_BDP_2010_2/en/ (accessed 25 October 2019).  
19 
 
1. [Develop] a better understanding of the potential risks associated with accidents 
and the deliberate misuse of life sciences research; 
2. Learn about practical measures that will enable them to manage some of the risks 
posed by life sciences research; 
3. Assess their needs and capacities using a self-assessment tool to review existing 
structures and mechanisms and identify potential needs.62 
 
The OIE Biological Threat Reduction Strategy: Strengthening Global Biological Security that 
was published in 2015 seeks to develop a sustainable and effective protection against threats 
from deliberate and accidental releases of animal pathogens by strengthening existing 
systems for surveillance, early on-farm detection, and rapid response and fostering scientific 
networks for promoting biosafety and biosecurity.63 To facilitate the achievement of these 
objectives, the OIE has developed Guidelines for Investigation of Suspicious Biological 
Events and Guidelines for Responsible Conduct in Veterinary Research. The Guidelines for 
Investigation of Suspicious Biological Events are intended to aid Veterinary Services to 
prepare for the investigation of suspicious biological events in relation to animal health, 
regardless of their origin, taking into account the additional challenges related to joint 
investigations.64 The Guidelines for Responsible Conduct in Veterinary Research seek to 
raise awareness about the dual-use potential of research in veterinary settings, supporting 
veterinary professionals, researchers and other stakeholders to effectively identify, assess and 
manage dual-use implications.65 
 
A model for an integrated approach for preventing the deliberate use of biological agents and 
addressing the unique biological security and safety challenges around the world is the 
Biological Security Working Group of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons 
and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Global Partnership is an international forum of 31 
States that was launched in 2002 to counter CBRN terrorism and proliferation. Its Biological 
Security Working Group works in conjunction with the Global Health Security Agenda 
focusing on five inter-related areas of activity which underscore the vital importance of 
strengthening the web of prevention for ensuring effective biosafety and biosecurity 
worldwide. These areas include:  
 
 Secure and account for materials that represent biological proliferation risks. 
                                                          
62 World Health Organization, Responsible life sciences research for global health security: a guidance 
document (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2010),  
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/HSE_GAR_BDP_2010_2/en/ (accessed 25 October 2019). 
63 World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Biological threat reduction strategy: strengthening global 
biological security, Paris, October 2015, https://www.oie.int/scientific-expertise/biological-threat-reduction/ 
(accessed 25 October 2019).  
64 World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Guidelines for investigation of suspicious biological events 
(Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health, 2018), 
https://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Our_scientific_expertise/docs/pdf/Guidelines_Investigation_Suspiciou
s_Biological_Events.pdf (accessed 25 October 2019).  
65 World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), Guidelines for responsible conduct in veterinary research 
(Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health, 2019), 
https://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Our_scientific_expertise/docs/pdf/BTR/A_GUIDELINES_VETERIN
ARY_RESEARCH.pdf (accessed 25 October 2019).  
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 Develop and maintain appropriate and effective measures to prevent, prepare for, 
detect and disrupt the deliberate misuse of biological agents. 
 Strengthen national and international capabilities to rapidly identify, confirm/assess 
and respond to biological attacks. 
 Reinforce and strengthen the BTWC and other biological disarmament and non-
proliferation obligations, principles, practices and instruments. 
 Reduce biological proliferation risks through the advancement and promotion of safe 
and responsible conduct.66  
 
4. Conclusions 
As noted in the conclusion of 1997 JAMA paper: 
 
In considering biological control regimes for the future, it is instructive to look back 
over the developments in both security and environmental controls.67 
Addressing the complex spectre of biological risks in the twenty-first century that ranges 
from naturally occurring disease outbreaks, laboratory-acquired infections, and negligence to 
the deliberate release of pathogens and toxins against humans, animals, or plants requires the 
full and effective implementation of both international biosafety and biosecurity instruments. 
The web of prevention can serve as a conceptual framework for developing an understanding 
of the mutually reinforcing relationship of these two sets of instruments and devising 
integrated policy strategies for promoting compliance with their provisions. Consideration 
should be given to the following steps and measures for strengthening the web of prevention: 
1. Universalisation of international legally binding instruments. Table 1 provides 
information on the status of ratification of the international Conventions and Protocols that 
have been examined in the preceding section. By participating actively in relevant 
international agreements, States develop an appreciation of the complementary role of these 
agreements and are more likely to take effective steps for their national implementation.  
2. Enhancing the interaction between the existing international mechanisms for 
multilateral negotiations with relevance to biosafety and biosecurity. It is important that 
the outcomes achieved in one area of biological risk management are fed in a timely manner 
into the proceedings of other international agreements, in order to ensure cross-fertilisation 
and effective data sharing. For instance, those working in the field of disarmament need to be 
kept up-to-date with international policy developments in the field of environmental 
protection and health, and vice versa.  
3. Creating platforms for promoting effective action in support of the web of prevention 
for biological risk management. Biological risk management is complex and multifaceted, 
                                                          
66 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Biological Security 
Working Group, 2019, https://www.gpwmd.com/bswg (accessed 25 October 2019).  




and hence it is important that the existing processes for international multilateral negotiations 
are supplemented with opportunities for a broad stakeholder engagement. Semi-formal or 
informal forums and platforms can bring together both government and civil society 
representatives, including industry and academia, in order to foster the development of 
innovative solutions and facilitate the transfer of best practices and lessons learned. As such, 
they can play an instrumental role in informing States’ efforts to promote common 
understanding and effective action on strengthening the norms of biosafety and biosecurity 
worldwide.  
4. Developing integrated approaches for the national implementation of all elements of 
the web of prevention for biological risk management. International law defines the legal 
responsibilities of States in their conduct with each other, and their treatment of individuals 
within State boundaries.68 With regard to biological risk management, States are expected to 
take all necessary steps to ensure that all elements of the web of prevention are effectively 
implemented nationally within the territories under their jurisdiction. The implementation of 
integrated approaches and initiatives that are underpinned by cross-sectorial collaboration at 
national level is to be encouraged, in order to ensure that all those engaged in the life sciences 
whether in government, academia, industry, or as individuals are aware of their responsibility 
to cause no harm.69 
 
Table 1: Membership in International Legally Binding Agreements / International 
Organisations with Relevance to Biological Risk Management (as of October 2019) 
International Agreement/Organisation 
Number of 
States Parties  
 




193 and 2 
observers 






                                                          
68 United Nations, Uphold International Law, 2019, https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/uphold-
international-law/ (accessed 5 November 2019). 
69 Examples of integrated national approaches for biological risk management include: Portugal, 
Biopreparedness field training exercises: national and international capacity-building, 
BWC/MSP/2017/WP.11, Meeting of the States Parties, 1 December 2017, 
https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2017/WP.11; United Kingdom, Strengthening national implementation: The UK 
Biological Security Strategy, BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.4, Meeting of Experts on Strengthening National 
Implementation, 31 July 2018, https://undocs.org/en/bwc/msp/2018/mx.3/wp.4; United States of America, 
Strengthening national implementation: The United States National Biodefense Strategy, 
BWC/MSP/2019/MX.3/WP.1, Meeting of Experts on Strengthening National Implementation, 11 July 2019, 
https://undocs.org/bwc/msp/2019/mx.3/wp.1; Mexico, Institutional actions for the implementation of the BWC 
in Mexico, presentation delivered during the 2019 BWC Meeting of Experts on Review of Developments in the 
Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention, 31 July 2019, 
https://www.onug.ch/unog/website/disarmament.nsf/(httpPages)/99E884C517B29FCEC12583C1003FB1D3?O
penDocument (all accessed 4 November 2019).  
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International Plant Protection Convention 
https://www.ippc.int/en/structure/  
 






189 including the 
EU 
 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
https://www.cbd.int/information/parties.shtml  
 
196 including the 
EU 
 




172 including the 
EU 
 
Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress 
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/supplementary/  
 
45 including the 
EU 
 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization 
https://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-protocol/signatories/default.shtml  
119 including the 
EU 
 
